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Frank Miller’s Sin City College
Football: A Game to Die For And Other
Lessons About the Right of Publicity
and Video Games
Jordan M. Blanke
Abstract
The challenge of finding a workable solution for applying the
right of publicity is a formidable one because it implicates not only
a delicate balance between First Amendment rights and the rights
of publicity, but also the complications of varying state laws. The
best of the tests developed by the courts so far—the transformative
use test—was borrowed from copyright law and itself reflects a
careful balance between First Amendment and copyright interests.
Additionally, because of dramatic progress in technology, it is
likely that in the near future this balancing will often involve not
only the rights of publicity and the First Amendment but also
copyright law as well.
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I. Introduction
In his excellent Note, Garrett Rice proposes a simple onesentence test as a solution for applying the right of publicity to
video games.1 He outlines the history of the right of publicity and
discusses the seminal cases, both those prior to and during the
video game era.2 He examines the three most commonly used
tests, the Rogers test, the predominant use test, and the
transformative use test and appropriately rejects the first two
outright.3 The Rogers test just was not designed nor intended to
apply to something as complex as a video game, and the
predominant factors test has been correctly described as
“subjective at best, arbitrary at worst.”4
The transformative use test, developed by the California
Supreme Court in Comedy III Productions v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,5
(Comedy III) is “essentially a balancing test between the First
Amendment and the right of publicity based on whether the work
in question adds significant creative elements so as to be
transformed into something more than a mere celebrity likeness

1. See generally R. Garrett Rice, Note, “Groove is in the Hart:” A Workable
Solution for Applying the Right of Publicity to Video Games, 72 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 317 (2015).
2. See id. (providing a thorough discussion of the relevant history of the
right and seminal case law animating it).
3. See id. at 333–40 (maintaining that the application of these tests has
produced inconsistent and unpredictable results).
4. Id. at 362.
5. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
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or imitation.”6 This test has been the most commonly used one,
but as Rice notes, it “is subjective and difficult to apply
consistently as . . . contradicting district court rulings . . . highlight.”7
Rice proposes a “readily identifiable” standard: “A video
game violates an individual’s right of publicity if a person
familiar with the individual would look at a video game character
and know immediately that the character is definitively based on
the real individual.”8 Application of the test compares favorably
with existing precedent. Rice applies it to five of the more recent
video game cases with good results, yielding the same results as
those found by the courts.9
There remain, however, some larger issues that cast shadows
on this still-developing area of law. I believe that there are four
major challenges that still plague the balancing between and
among the rights of publicity, the First Amendment, and
copyright law.
There is a great deal of First Amendment protection for both
news reporting about public events, like football games, and for
publicly available information, like the statistics generated by a
football game.10 How will this federal protection be balanced
against state right of publicity laws?
State right of publicity laws vary greatly.11 Will a federal
standard be able to apply to all the variations in these laws?
Most right of publicity laws protect one’s “name and
likeness,” and courts have traditionally treated it as one interest.
Will courts continue the trend towards considering “name” and
“likeness” as separate interests?”12

6. Id. at 799.
7. See Rice, supra note 1, at 363.
8. Id. at 366.
9. See id. at 373–77 (indicating that the proposed test produces the same
results with greater predictability and ease).
10. See infra Part III.A (noting that First Amendment protection exists
because these are matters in the public interest and are not subject to copyright
protection).
11. See infra Part III.B (pointing out that some states protect more
characteristics than other states).
12. See infra Part III.C (indicating that courts sometimes discuss “name
and likeness” as an interest without distinguishing between the two).
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Tests that attempt to balance interests involving the First
Amendment and the right of publicity (or the First Amendment
and copyright) generally look at how much transformation there
is between the original work and the second work. Just how much
transformation is enough transformation to warrant independent
protection for the second item?13
II. Frank Miller’s Sin City College Football: A Game to Die For
Before addressing these issues in more detail, let me first
present a hypothetical example. Suppose that Arts Electronic,
Inc. (AE) releases a new video game called Frank Miller’s Sin
City College Football: A Game to Die For. The graphics in the
game are quite beautiful—very stylized—just like a carefully
drawn graphic novel. Most of the game is in black and white,
although there are some brief bursts of color—mostly red. The
field upon which the game is played is not your typical football
field. The sidelines change continually. Sometimes there are
cliffs, sometimes there are brick walls, and sometimes there are
just dark, open spaces. The coach for one of the teams is Woody
Hayes, of Ohio State fame—the other coach is Bear Bryant, of
Alabama.
One of the quarterbacks looks just like Ryan Hart14 and
another one just like Sam Keller.15 The Hart character is
interesting—with the pointer finger of his right hand he can
levitate opposing players for fractions of a second. And the Keller
character has the ability to become invisible for split seconds at a
time. Both of these skills come in very handy on dashes to those
13. Infra Part III.D.
14. Ryan Hart played quarterback at Rutgers University from 2004 to
2005. He brought suit against EA, alleging that his right of publicity had been
violated because of his depiction in EA’s NCAA Football video game. The district
court found for EA, Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757 (D.N.J. 2011),
but the circuit court reversed, finding for Hart, 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013). See
Rice, supra note 1, at 320–21.
15. Sam Keller played quarterback at Arizona State University from 2003
to 2005. He brought a similar action against EA and won at both the district
court and circuit court level, Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010
WL 530108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010), affirmed sub nom., In re NCAA StudentAthlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). See
Rice, supra note 1, at 320–21.
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sidelines. There are two other characters in the game worth
mentioning. First, there is a very large and brutal defensive
lineman called Tony Twist—he is quite the enforcer. Second,
there is a wide receiver named Ulala, who has quite an array of
very tricky moves.
Obviously, there would be some major trademark and
copyright obstacles. Absent a license agreement from Frank
Miller, Robert Rodriguez, or Dimension Films, trademark law
would almost certainly prevent the use of either “Frank Miller” or
“Sin City” in the title of the game.16 Similarly, there would
probably be a successful copyright action if the expression in the
game is as “substantially similar,” as the description above
suggests, to the film and graphic novels upon which the film is
based.17 Beyond that, however, some interesting questions
remain.
III. Four Challenges
A. How Will Federal First Amendment Protection Be Balanced
Against State Right of Publicity Laws?
There is a great deal of First Amendment protection for
public events, including sporting events.18 The statistics
16. While it might be difficult for Frank Miller to claim trademark
protection in his name itself, the fact that it has been used in connection with
Sin City several times would be important. See Brandon Johansson, Note, Pause
the Game: Are Video Game Producers Punting Away the Publicity Rights of
Retired Athletes?, 10 NEV. L.J. 784, 806 (2010); Anthony M. Verna III,
www.whatisina.name, 14 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 153 (2004).
17. See Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394,
1406 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that an author had mimicked the very distinctive
style of Dr. Seuss and that the work was not a parody, was not transformative,
and was not a fair use).
18. See generally Jordan M. Blanke, No Doubt About It—You’ve Got to Have
Hart: Simulation Video Games May Redefine the Balance Between and Among
the Right of Publicity, the First Amendment, and Copyright Law, 19 B.U. J. SCI.
& TECH. L. 26 (2013). See also Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40
Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 641–43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that not only were
newspaper accounts and photographs of Joe Montana’s performances in the
Super Bowl entitled to First Amendment protection because they were matters
in the public interest, but so were posters containing those same photographs).
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generated by performance of a game are readily available in
newspapers, protected by the First Amendment, and not subject
to copyright protection.19 The fantasy sports cases from a few
years ago plainly spell that out. In C.B.C. Distribution &
Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.,20
(CBC) there was a question as to whether a licensing agreement
was required in order for a fantasy sports league to use the
names and biographical information of baseball players, along
with the statistics generated by their performances on the field.
The Eighth Circuit held that the players did have rights of
publicity in that information under Missouri law, but that CBC’s
First Amendment rights outweighed those rights of publicity.21
The court held that because the information used by CBC in its
fantasy games was already in the public domain, its use was
clearly protected by the First Amendment.22 The court noted how
important statistics and records had become in baseball and how
it was part of the appeal of the game.23 Because the court held
that First Amendment rights outweighed rights of publicity, it
did not address whether federal copyright law would preempt
state rights of publicity.24
A district court in the Eighth Circuit took this holding even
further. In CBS Interactive Inc. v. NFL Players Ass’n, Inc.,25
(CBS) the District Court for the District of Minnesota held, as a
matter of law, that CBS could use in its fantasy football game not
only the names and statistics of the players but also the entire
“package” of information about the players, including “names,
player profiles, up-to-date statistics, injury reports, participant
blogs, pictures, images, and biographical information.”26
The environment for fantasy sports changed dramatically
after these cases. For example, in the video game MVP Baseball
19. See generally Blanke, supra note 18, at 47–50.
20. 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court denied a petition for
writ of certiorari, MLB Adv. Media v. C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc., 553
U.S. 1090 (2008).
21. C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 822–24.
22. Id. at 823.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 824.
25. 259 F.R.D. 398 (D. Minn. 2009).
26. Id. at 417.
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2005, the slugging right fielder of the San Francisco Giants was
named Jon Dowd, rather than Barry Bonds, because Bonds had
not signed the Major League Players Association Licensing
Agreement, and it was not clear whether the gaming companies
could use Bonds’s name in the game without his consent. The
performance of the Jon Dowd character in the game was identical
to how the Bonds character would have performed because the
programmers used Bonds’s statistics to generate the character.
Certainly after the CBC and CBS cases, it is clear that fantasy
sports games can include use of both the names of players and
the statistics generated by the players.
Many video games contain what is often called a career mode
or a franchise mode. Rather than playing a game in which the
user simulates the action of a sport by manipulating a keyboard
or control pad to pitch, hit, throw, run, catch, kick or tackle, the
user becomes, in effect, a general manager of the team. He or she
drafts players, makes trades, sets starting lineups and rotations,
and selects plays. Individual games or seasons of games can then
be simulated, producing wins, losses and all the statistics a user
cares to generate. These modes typically do not contain, nor do
they need to contain, in order to be realistic, any images or
likenesses of the players.
It certainly follows from the CBC and CBS cases that all of
the information used and generated in these career or franchise
modes are protected by the First Amendment. Under the CBS
holding, even pictures and images of the players would be
protected.27 Even for the action modes of these video games, the
CBS holding would suggest that the First Amendment would
protect pictures and images of the players.28
To a large extent, this issue goes beyond the test proposed by
Rice. While he states about his test that “a video game deserves
27. See id. (“Thus, like in C.B.C. Distribution, the package of information
used here comes within the ambit of the First Amendment.”).
28. It is certainly still the case that copyrighted photographs or images
would not be able to be used in a video game without proper licensing; and it is
certainly still the case that the logos of teams or leagues would not be able to be
used without proper licensing. Even the CBS holding did not go as far as to
include logos within the “package” of information that could be used without
licensing. Id. However, just like the names of players, the names of teams and
leagues should be fully protected by the First Amendment for use in a realitybased sports game as they are readily and publicly available.
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First Amendment protection if the individual’s likeness is not
both immediately and definitely obvious,” there may be certain
situations, like those in a career mode of a video game and
possibly even in an action mode—certainly according to CBS—
where First Amendment interests will simply outweigh rights of
publicity, and whether a character is readily identifiable is
irrelevant.29
B. How Will a Federal Standard Apply to the Variety of State
Publicity Laws?
Thirty-one states recognize the right of publicity either by
statute or by common law.30 The laws vary greatly from state to
state.31 Some protect more characteristics of a person than others.
For example, New York protects only one’s “name, portrait,
picture or voice,”32 while California protects one’s “name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness,”33 and Indiana protects one’s
“name, voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, distinctive
appearance, gesture, or mannerisms.”34 Certainly, under Indiana
law, one could allege that a unique batting stance or a particular
way of celebrating a touchdown has been misappropriated by a
video game’s realistic portrayal of that activity.
Even more troubling are the issues surrounding post-mortem
rights of publicity and jurisdictional ramifications.35 Some states
29. See Rice, supra note 1, at 366–73 (advocating for a readily identifiable
test).
30. See id. at 330 nn.82–83.
31. See Blanke, supra note 18, at 61–65 (“Among the . . . variations . . . are:
(1) the scope of the right; (2) the rights of the deceased; (3) the duration of the
right; (4) the jurisdictional domiciliary requirements; and (5) whether or not the
right is to be applied retroactively.”); see also Brittany A. Adkins, Comment,
Crying Out for Uniformity: Eliminating State Inconsistencies in Right of
Publicity Protection Through a Uniform Right of Publicity Act, 40 CUMB. L. REV.
499, 501 (2010) (“[M]ost . . . states vary substantially in the methods chosen to
protect one’s right to control the commercial exploitation of his or her
persona . . . .”).
32. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2002).
33. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2012).
34. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-7 (West 2002).
35. See Blanke, supra note 18, at 61–65 (noting that states’ laws vary
greatly on this issue, which can entirely foreclose relief for plaintiffs).
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provide for descendible and assignable rights of publicity after
one’s death.36 Under California law, this right can last for 70
years after death, in Indiana and Oklahoma, 100 years, and in
Tennessee, forever.37 Cases have already dealt with complex
issues pertaining to place of domicile, place of death, and whether
the statutory or common law right of publicity existed at the time
and place of death.38
In my Frank Miller’s Sin City College Football example,
Woody Hayes and Bear Bryant were domiciliaries of and died in
Ohio and Alabama, respectively. Even if the laws of those two
states do not provide for protection as broad as Indiana law or for
as long as Indiana law, it may not matter to their heirs or
assignees. Indiana law “applies to an act or event that occurs
within Indiana, regardless of a person’s domicile, residence, or
citizenship.”39 Both Hayes and Bryant no doubt played some big
games against Notre Dame and Purdue within the state of
Indiana. Furthermore, as long as a t-shirt with their image or a
video game with their name or likeness or distinctive appearance
or mannerism was sold in Indiana, an action may exist under
Indiana law.
There is, however, a big question as to whether states that do
not have as broad a right of publicity will respect such reach. In
Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc.,40 the
District Court for the Southern District Of New York refused to
recognize a right of publicity interest under Indiana law because
at the time of her death, the deceased (Marilyn Monroe), was not
an Indiana domiciliary nor did a post-mortem interest even exist
under Indiana law.41
In Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd.,42
the Ninth Circuit decided a case involving a Washington state
36. Id. at 62–63; see Adkins, supra note 31, at 500–01 (describing
differences in state law).
37. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(g); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-8; OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1448(G) (West 2010); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-1104(b)(2) (2012).
38. See generally Blanke, supra note 18, at 62–64; Adkins supra note 31, at
505–29.
39. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-1 (West 2002).
40. 486 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
41. Id. at 314–16.
42. 742 F.3d 377 (9th Cir. 2014).
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right of publicity statute that applied “regardless of place or
domicile or place of domicile at time of death.”43 The court stated
that “Washington’s approach to post-mortem personality rights
raises difficult questions regarding whether another state must
recognize the broad personality rights that Washington
provides.”44 While deciding that the statute was applicable in the
instant case and that it need not address that broader issue, the
court noted that a New York case had found to the contrary in
Shaw.45
While there have been arguments for a uniform right of
publicity46 and for a federal right of publicity,47 I believe that the
more likely resolution and the more practical approach will come
from First Amendment or copyright preemption jurisprudence
from the circuit courts and, eventually, from the Supreme Court.
C. Will Courts Continue to Treat “Name” and “Likeness”
Differently than “Name and Likeness?”
Most right of publicity laws protect, among varying other
things, one’s “name and likeness.”48 We are starting to see—and I
think will continue to see—some distinctions being made between
the two separate terms and the whole. In the CBC fantasy stats
case, the Eighth Circuit held that the names of the players and
43. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 63.60.010 (West, Westlaw through 2013
legislation).
44. Experience Hendrix, 742 F.3d at 384.
45. Id. at 385 n.6.
46. See Adkins, supra note 31, at 524–53 (explaining that states vary on
the right of publicity); Rice, supra note 1, at 353–54 nn.242–47 (proposing a
readily identifiable standard).
47. See Susannah M. Rooney, Note, Just Another Brown-Eyed Girl: Toward
a Limited Federal Right of Publicity Under the Lanham Act in a Digital Age of
Celebrity Dominance, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 921, 944–57 (2013) (determining that
Congress has this authority through the Commerce Clause); Sean D. Whaley,
“I’m a Highway Star”: An Outline for a Federal Right of Publicity, 31 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 257, 260–66 (2009) (providing economic, moral, and federal
authority justifications); Rice, supra note 1, at 354–57 nn.248–69 (proposing a
unique federal standard); Blanke, supra note 18, at 64 n.332 (analyzing
copyright law).
48. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46–49 (1995)
(providing an overview of right of publicity laws); Rice, supra note 1, at 330
nn.82–83 (listing state right of publicity laws, either codified or in common law).
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the statistics generated by their performances in a game were
protected by the First Amendment.49 In the CBS case, a district
court in Minnesota extended that holding significantly, including
within that “package” of information, pictures, and images of the
players.50 Obviously, this issue will be significant for video games,
particularly those that are reality-based.
In the Keller case, the Ninth Circuit held that “[u]nder
California’s transformative use defense, EA’s use of the likenesses
of college athletes like Samuel Keller in its video game is not, as a
matter of law, protected by the First Amendment.”51 In O’Bannon
v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,52 which dealt with several
issues besides rights of publicity, the court spoke many times
throughout its decision about “name and likeness,” but when it
discussed the Keller holding, it not insignificantly referred to
“likenesses” rather than “names and likenesses.”53
Somewhat ironically, the NCAA Football games included
everything but the names of the players.54 They included detailed
biographical and physical information, player uniform numbers,
performance ratings based upon actual game data, and accurate
graphical depictions of the players.55 Certainly, in the context of
the game, it was clear to a user who the characters in the game
were because of the likenesses and the other biographical and
statistical information. Users could add the names of the players
if they so desired, and apparently, there were files available for
49. See C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball
Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F. 3d 818, 822–23 (8th Cir. 2007) (discussing the
First Amendment claims brought by plaintiffs).
50. See CBS Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, Inc.,
259 F.R.D. 398, 417 (D. Minn. 2009) (explaining that the package of information
at issue in the case falls under First Amendment protection).
51. In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724
F.3d 1268, 1284 (9th Cir. 2013).
52 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014). For a thorough discussion of
O’Bannon, see Marc Edelman, O’Bannon: A Small Step Forward for CollegeAthlete Rights, and a Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
2319 (2014).
53. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 977 n.13 (discussing Keller’s holding
regarding the use of college athletes’ likenesses).
54. See, e.g., NCAA FOOTBALL 2005 (Electronic Arts, Inc. 2004) (depicting
athletes but not including their names).
55. See, e.g., id. (providing many biographical details on players).
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download that would add the names of all the players to the
game.56
A simple explanation for why the O’Bannon court may have
referred to “likenesses” is that the NCAA Football game did not
include the players’ names. However, in the context of the game,
there was no doubt who the characters were. Furthermore, a
better argument could be made by the players that they have a
stronger right of publicity interest in their likenesses than in
their names. As discussed above, the names and numbers of the
players, along with the statistics generated by their on-field
performances, would almost certainly be protected in both the
career mode and the action mode of the game by the First
Amendment.57 It still remains to be seen whether the holding of
the CBS case will be extended to also protect pictures and images
of players in the game.
D. How Much Transformation is Enough Transformation to
Warrant Independent Protection for a Second Work?
The last challenge may be the most difficult: just how much
transformation is enough transformation for a derivative item to
warrant independent protection? This issue is not new to video
games.58 It has been at the heart of the controversy in attempting
to balance the interests protected by the First Amendment and by
rights of publicity—and sometimes, also, by copyright.59 The
56. See, e.g., id. (allowing game users to add the names of players).
57. See, e.g., C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball
Advanced Media, 505 F.3d 818, 822–23 (8th Cir. 2007) (discussing First
Amendment protection of player information).
58. See Blanke, supra note 18, at 33–46 (addressing right of publicity for
baseball cards and other images).
59. In Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001),
a case decided around the same time as Comedy III, the court held that there
was First Amendment protection for a computer-altered photograph of actor
Dustin Hoffman in a scene reminiscent of his role as a woman in the film
Tootsie. It is one of the first times that a court recognized that the balancing
might involving three important interests: “We evaluate this defense aware of
‘the careful balance that courts have gradually constructed between the right of
publicity and the First Amendment and federal intellectual property laws.’” See
id. at 1183–84 (quoting Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 626
(6th Cir. 2000)). See generally Blanke, supra note 18 (covering First Amendment
protection and rights of publicity).
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problem is probably best exemplified by the discussion in Comedy
III about the difference between an Andy Warhol rendition of
Marilyn Monroe and a Gary Saderup rendition of the Three
Stooges.60
Gary Saderup is an artist.61 He created a drawing of the
Three Stooges.62 When his company began selling t-shirts with
this image, he was sued by another company that held the
descendible rights of publicity of the Three Stooges, claiming an
interest under California law.63 One of the toughest issues the
court had to grapple with—and one I do not think it satisfactorily
resolved—was how is a court supposed to determine when an
“artist” adds enough “significant transformative or creative
contribution” to a work to warrant First Amendment (or
copyright) protection.64
In attempting to distinguish the work of Gary Saderup from
the work of Andy Warhol, the Comedy III court stated:
[W]e do not hold that all reproductions of celebrity portraits
are unprotected by the First Amendment. The silkscreens of
Andy Warhol, for example, have as their subjects the images of
such celebrities as Marilyn Monroe, Elizabeth Taylor, and
Elvis Presley. Through distortion and the careful
manipulation of context, Warhol was able to convey a message
that went beyond the commercial exploitation of celebrity
images and became a form of ironic social comment on the
dehumanization of celebrity itself. Such expression may well
be entitled to First Amendment protection.65

60. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811
(Cal. 2001) (“Through distortion and the careful manipulation of context,
Warhol was able to convey a message that went beyond the commercial
exploitation of celebrity images and became a form of ironic social comment on
the dehumanization of celebrity itself.”).
61. See id. at 800 (“Saderup is an artist with over 25 years’ experience in
making charcoal drawings of celebrities.”).
62. See id. at 801 (describing the charcoal lithograph Saderup made of the
Three Stooges).
63. See id. (providing an overview and claims of the lawsuit).
64. See id. at 811 (addressing the issue of when a work of art can receive
First Amendment protection).
65. Id. (internal citation and footnote omitted). Andy Warhol’s famous
silkscreens of Marilyn Monroe were created in 1962 and based upon a publicity
shot taken by photographer Gene Korman for the film Niagra in 1953. I have
not been able to determine whether Korman gave permission to Warhol to use
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Gary Saderup has available for sale on a web site,66 a
portrait he made of Marilyn Monroe. How does a court determine
whether this work is worthy of First Amendment protection? How
does the court assess the “artistic” merit of the sketch? Does it
compare the relative “artistry” of the work to his Three Stooges
drawing or maybe to the Warhol depiction of Marilyn? Does the
decision hinge upon the fame of the artist? Would Warhol’s
Marilyn automatically get more protection than Saderup’s
Marilyn because Warhol is more famous than Saderup? How and
when does a court determine who will be tomorrow’s Andy
Warhol?67
There are no satisfactory answers to these questions. The
determinations will be necessarily chock-full of subjectivity.
This same quandary was involved in a dispute between Tiger
Woods and a company that created a montage painting
containing various images of Woods, the Masters’ Tournament,
and other past champions of the Masters’ Tournament.68 The
district court found that the painting violated Woods’s right of
publicity under Ohio law.69 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed, and citing Comedy III, held that “when a work
contains significant transformative elements, it is not only
especially worthy of First Amendment protection, but it is also
less likely to interfere with the economic interest protected by the
the photograph or whether he was compensated for it, but it presents an
interesting question: What if Korman had claimed a copyright interest in his
photograph? Today this would involve a fair use or transformation analysis
under copyright law, which would be very similar to the analysis involved in the
right of publicity cases using the transformative use test from Comedy III. I
believe that we will begin to see more and more of these balances involving all
three of these interests.
66. See Marilyn Monroe, GALLERY4COLLECTORS, http://gallery4collectors.
com/GarySaderup-MarilynMonroe.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2015) (listing a
portrait of Marilyn Monroe for sale and providing a short biography on her) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
67. See generally William K. Ford & Raizel Liebler, Games Are Not Coffee
Mugs: Games and the Right of Publicity, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 1 (2012) (discussing how courts should decide rights of publicity in
gaming).
68. See Blanke, supra note 18, at 38–39 (explaining the Tiger Woods
dispute with a company over his image).
69. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 829, 836 (N.D. Ohio
2000) (dismissing a motion for summary judgment because the painting had
violated the right of publicity).
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right of publicity.”70 The court continued, “[a]ccordingly, First
Amendment protection of such works outweighs whatever
interest the state may have in enforcing the right of publicity.”71
Another way to view this issue is from the vantage point of
the right of publicity. If its purpose is to protect—and potentially
monetize—the fame and celebrity of an individual, is there
anything that can outweigh this interest? Basically, in the
context of video games, it may come from First Amendment
protection for newsworthiness or from First Amendment
protection for information that is publicly available and in the
public domain (and not protected by copyright law).72
Courts have had a difficult time trying to determine how
much transformation is enough, or in the words of the Comedy III
court, “whether the work in question adds significant creative
elements so as to be transformed into something more than a
mere celebrity likeness or imitation.”73 The California Supreme
Court, which created the transformative use test in Comedy III,
found enough transformation a few years later when a comic book
depicted two brothers, Johnny and Edgar Autumn, as half-worm
and half-human, with long white hair and albino features, based
upon famous musician brothers Johnny and Edgar Winter.74 The
California Court of Appeal also found enough transformation in a
video game character, who like the lead singer of a retro-funkdance band popular in the 1990s wore platform shoes, brightly
colored clothes, often with a number written on her chest, bare
midriff, a blue backpack, red/pink hair, and pigtails and had a
musical introduction with the words “ooh la la.”75 But the
70. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 935 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citing Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal.
2001)).
71. Id.
72. See supra notes 18, 20 (regarding the Montana case and the fantasy
stat case).
73. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 799, 808 (Cal.
2001); see Blanke, supra note 18, at 39–46 (discussing the Comedy III
transformative test).
74. See Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 479–80 (Cal. 2003) (explaining
that the comic book characters transformed enough to not violate right of
publicity); see also Blanke, supra note 18, at 39–42 (discussing Winter); Rice,
supra note 1, at 339–40 (same).
75. See Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 615–17 (Cal. Ct.
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Supreme Court of Missouri, using the predominant factors test,
rather than the transformative use test, did not find enough
transformation in a comic book character named Tony Twist,
whose name was admittedly borrowed from a tough hockey
player known as an “enforcer,” but whose character was a Mafia
don who looked nothing like the hockey player.76 The court noted
how similar the facts were to the Winter case, but decided
completely opposite.77
Similarly, in the two cases involving exactly the same facts—
and the same NCAA Football video game—the district courts in
California and New Jersey came to opposite conclusions.78 The
Northern District of California held that the depiction of
quarterback Sam Keller was not sufficiently transformative to
bar his right of publicity claim;79 while the District Court for the
District of New Jersey held that the depiction of quarterback
Ryan Hart was sufficiently transformative and warranted First
Amendment protection.80 The Third and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeal, however, did reach the same conclusion on review,
holding that there was not enough transformation in the
depiction of the quarterbacks.81
App. 2006) (discussing the transformative test and its application to the current
case); see also Blanke, supra note 18, at 43–44 (discussing the transformative
test); Rice, supra note 1, at 342–43 (covering Kirby).
76. See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (using the
predominant factors test); see also Blanke, supra note 18, at 41–43 (discussing
the transformative test in TCI Cablevision); Rice, supra note 1, at 340–42
(same).
77. See Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 373 (describing Winter as “a case with a
remarkably similar fact situation”).
78. See infra notes 67–68 (discussing these cases).
79. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 794 (D.N.J. 2011)
(concluding “that EA is entitled to First Amendment protection under either the
transformative test or either of the Rogers’ tests”).
80. Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10719, at *34 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (“Assuming that the challenged causes of
action arise from protected activity, Plaintiff makes a sufficient showing of his
probability of success on the merits.”).
81. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 170 (3d Cir. 2013) (“We
therefore hold that the NCAA Football 2004, 2005 and 2006 games at issue in
this case do not sufficiently transform Appellant’s identity to escape the right of
publicity claim . . . .”); In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1284 (9th Cir. 2013) (“EA’s use of the likenesses of college
athletes like Samuel Keller in its video games is not, as a matter of law,
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Basically the bottom line with applying these tests—and the
nearly impossible determination of just how much transformation
is enough—or alternatively, when a “work” becomes a “work of
art”—is that different courts using different tests have come to
different conclusions, and that different courts using the same
test have come to different conclusions.
In my Frank Miller’s Sin City College Football example,82 it
would seem that the more different the Ryan Hart and Sam
Keller avatars are from their real-life persona, the less likely that
there would be a successful right of publicity claim. Certainly,
that appears to be the case under the transformative use test—at
least in most of the cases.83 Having the ability to levitate
opposing players or to disappear may be the beginning of a
sufficient enough transformation to warrant First Amendment
protection. That surely seems to be the lesson from the Winter
and Kirby cases.
This becomes similar to using the “substantial similarity”
test in copyright law in order to determine whether there is
infringement. In Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer
Electronics Corp.,84 the designer of a PAC-MAN-like knock-off
video game had instructed his designers to make the characters
in the game a little less like the original PAC-MAN characters in
order to avoid a finding of “substantial similarity.”85 Even with
these changes, however, the court held that the modified game
still captured the “‘total concept and feel’ of [the game and was]
substantially similar to PAC-MAN.”86 While a game designer
might want to transform his characters just enough to avoid a
finding of substantial similarity—or enough to warrant First
Amendment protection as a transformative independent
creation—the goal of a reality-based video game is to make the
characters and the game as realistic and true to life as possible.

protected by the First Amendment.”).
82. See supra Part II (discussing this video game).
83. See Blanke, supra note 18, at 39–41, 43–44 (discussing Winter and
Kirby); Rice, supra note 1, at 339–40, 342–43 (same).
84 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982).
85. See id. at 618 (describing the characters in the knock-off video game).
86. Id. at 619–20.
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According to Rice’s readily identifiable standard, it is a
person familiar with the individual who would have to know
immediately that the character is definitively based on the real
person.87 This would cover the situation where an obscure
offensive lineman, familiar possibly only to his family and
friends, might not be readily identifiable to an average game
player. To the person familiar with the lineman, however, he may
be readily identifiable.88
Another possible wrinkle to this standard is particularly
relevant to football. How readily identifiable are the characters
when they have their helmets on? It might be difficult even for
someone familiar with a player to recognize him with a helmet. It
would probably be easier to identify a baseball player, who
typically wears only a hat or maybe a batting helmet, and easier
yet in a basketball or soccer game, where a player typically wears
no hat or helmet, thus making him more readily identifiable.
Should this play a role in the determination?
IV. Conclusion
While the readily identifiable standard may do a good job of
identifying a possible violation of a right of publicity, there are
several larger issues which may make this determination moot if
more important issues outweigh that right in the first place. Just
because one’s name or likeness is readily identifiable in a video
game, it does not necessarily follow that one will (or should be)
successful in a right of publicity claim.
In a strong dissenting opinion in the Ninth Circuit Keller
case, Judge Thomas states that the “essence of NCAA Football is
founded on publicly available data, which is not protected by any
individual publicity right.”89 He notes that the personal vital
87. See Rice, supra note 1, at 366 (“A video game violates an individual’s
right of publicity if a person familiar with the individual would look at a video
game character and know immediately that the character is definitively based
on the real individual.”).
88. This may also be relevant to the discussion about whether a right of
publicity protects only those who are famous, as it is more likely the
quarterbacks, rather than the offensive linemen, will be well known. See
generally Rice, supra note 1.
89. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724
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statistics of the players in the video game and the statistical data
generated by their on-field performances are easily available and
indistinguishable from the information used in fantasy sports
leagues.90 “An athlete’s right of publicity simply does not
encompass publicly available statistical data.”91
Manuel Noriega, former military dictator of Panama,
recently brought suit against Activision for his inclusion in the
video game Call of Duty.92 His suit alleges a violation of his right
to publicity under California law.93 The game depicts Noriega as
a character in a reality-based history and war game.94 The
situation is not much different than a reality-based sports
game.95
Judge Thomas recognized the potential elephant in the room
in his Keller dissent, addressing the importance of the First
Amendment when balanced against rights of publicity:
The stakes are not small. The logical consequence of the
majority view is that all realistic depictions of actual persons,
no matter how incidental, are protected by a state law right of
publicity regardless of the creative context. This logic
jeopardizes the creative use of historic figures in motion
pictures, books, and sound recordings. Absent the use of actual
footage, the motion picture Forrest Gump might as well be just
F.3d 1268, 1288 (9th Cir. 2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
90. See id. (“[P]laying statistics are easily available.”).
91. Id.
92. See Eugene Volokh, Can Manuel Noriega Really Win his “Right of
Publicity” Lawsuit Against Activision?, WASH. POST (July 17, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/07/17/canmanuel-noriega-really-win-his-right-of-publicity-lawsuit-against-activision (last
visited Jan. 24, 2015) (describing the lawsuit) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Leo Kelion, Manuel Noriega Sues Activision Over Call of
Duty, BBC (July 16, 2014, 7:51 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology28326670 (last visited Jan. 24, 2015) (same) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
93. See Volokh, supra note 92 (describing the possibilities of Noriega
winning the right of publicity lawsuit).
94. See id. (“[T]he Noriega character is likewise represented in a realistic
context, as someone quite similar to what he was . . . .”).
95. See Blanke, supra note 18, at 57–60 (discussing reality-based video
games and their potential legal consequences). Reality-based music games also
present similar questions, although there may be some additional copyright
interests that make those situations even more difficult to resolve. Id. at 60–61
(providing scenarios revolving around reality-based music games).
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a box of chocolates. Without its historical characters, Midnight
in Paris would be reduced to a pedestrian domestic squabble.
The majority’s holding that creative use of realistic images and
personas does not satisfy the transformative use test cannot be
reconciled with the many cases affording such works First
Amendment protection.96

The right of publicity provides a person with the potential to
benefit financially from his or her fame or celebrity. But just like
every other right in a legal system, it is not an absolute. It must
be balanced against other rights and interests. Balancing a right
of publicity against the First Amendment is difficult to begin
with. Add to that mix the very different protections afforded by
varying state laws and it becomes even harder. Introducing a
copyright interest makes it even more difficult. It is important for
scholars and courts to experiment with different tests, but
ultimately, this is an area of the law screaming for resolution by
the Supreme Court.

96. In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724
F.3d 1268, 1290 (9th Cir. 2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

